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Abstract—This paper presents a lightweight cryptographic
system integrated onto a multi-function implantable biosensor
prototype. The resulting heterogeneous system provides a unique
and fundamental capability by immediately encrypting and
signing the sensor data upon its creation within the body. By
providing these security services directly on the implantable
sensor, a number of low-level attacks can be prevented. This
design uses the recently standardized SHA-3 Keccak secure hash
function implemented in an authenticated encryption mode. The
security module consists of the DuplexSponge security core and
the interface wrapper. The security core occupies only 1550 gate-
equivalents, which is the smallest authenticated encryption core
reported to date. The circuit is fabricated using 0.18 μm CMOS
technology and uses a supply voltage of 1.8 V. The simulated
power consumption of the complete cryptosystem with a 500
KHz clock is below 7 μW .
Index Terms—Lightweight encryption, Keccak hash function,
Authentication, Privacy, Implantable biosensor.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the development of new Implantable Medical
Devices (IMD) has allowed blood tests to be performed in
the patient’s body anywhere and at any time instead of in the
laboratories. The increased reliance on the IMD technology,
especially in the case of potentially life-saving therapies,
can introduce difﬁcult trade-offs in reliability and security.
Personal health information that was once restricted to the
conﬁnes of a medical laboratory, can now potentially be
accessible to various unauthorized parties.
Implantable biosensors are IMDs that measure biological
phenomena and send data to a more powerful device for
storage or analysis. They range from high-data-rate imaging
devices for the eye or brain to extremely low-data-rate for
glucose or other metabolites in the body. A subcutaneous
sensor involves an implanted biosensor that acts as a lab on a
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Fig. 1. Fully implantable subcutaneous medical device powered by a patch
located on top of the skin. The patch is wirelessly connected to a smart phone
for further data analysis and decision-making.
chip, conducting a small experiment on a sensor at molecular
or electrochemical level. More advanced subcutaneous sen-
sors are under development now that can detect drugs and
endogenous human metabolites, and simultaneously calibrate
for temperature and pH. Recent examples of subcutaneous
biosensors include injectable subcutaneous devices that are
remotely powered by a bandage-like patch that also provides
a data link to a higher level wearable device (as shown in
Fig. 1), possibly a body area network or, eventually, a higher-
level health information system [1].
Subcutaneous biosensors require a special set of security
and privacy [1]. A key problem with fully implanted sensors is
that small infrequent wireless transmission poses a greater pri-
vacy risk than large or continuous transmissions. For example,
a sensor may take several minutes to complete its task, then
deliver only a few bytes of data; giving this information a high
value per bit that may make it an attractive target. Short data
transmissions necessitate careful use of a cipher, especially
if the sensor data take only a few different values. On the
other hand, when a biosensor includes a patch that is meant
to pair with the sensor, additional risks arise. For example, the
patch of an unconscious patient can be removed and replaced
by another patch. Other challenges are low-power and low-
cost implementation, potential side-channel attacks, and key
management issues. Conventional key management schemes
can be used to allow access to the data by authorized parties
from physicians, to emergency personnel, insurance providers,
and even the user.
In [2] a lightweight wireless protocol for IMDs is pre-
sented that leverages well-studied wireless and cryptographic
technologies. In [3], [4], a hardware implementation of the
stream cipher Hummingbird is presented. In [5], the use of
block ciphers in IMD security is investigated. Recently, use
of sponge-based hash functions for authenticated encryption
was introduced [20]. Keccak, the winner of the SHA-3 com-
petition [6], [7] is the best known and most analyzed sponge-
based secure hash function. It allows various block sizes and
different modes of operation.
This paper presents a lightweight cryptographic system inte-
grated onto a multi-function subcutaneous biosensor prototype.
This design uses the recently standardized Keccak secure hash
function implemented in an authenticated encryption mode.
The resulting heterogeneous system provides a unique and
fundamental capability by immediately encrypting and signing
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the sensor data upon its creation within the body. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst cryptographic system for
implantable biosensors until now.
Section II describes the implantable device and its system
level design. The threat models are presented in Section III.
In Section IV we present the implemented encryption system.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The conceptual view of a subcutaneous IMD that receives
power via the inductive link is shown in Fig. 2 [8]. It consists
of a molecular sensor array for metabolite detection, a pH and
a temperature sensor for calibration, a multi-layer inductor for
powering and communication, and the front-end IC. The front-
end IC controls and reads out the sensor array and transmits the
measured data back to the patch. The front-end IC is where
the encryption and authentication system is implemented so
that the sensor data is signed and encrypted upon its creation
inside the body.
Fig. 3 shows the block diagram of the front-end IC. The
IC consists of a control and readout unit that can be con-
ﬁgured, according to the received commands from the patch,
to perform different types of electrochemical measurements
on different sensing sites of the sensor array. The detailed
description of the control and readout part of the IC are
presented in [9] and [10]. An analog to digital converter is
implemented in the IC to digitize the measured data. The
digital data goes through the data preparation unit to form a 16-
bit size data. This data then goes through the encryption unit.
The encryption unit takes four consequent data to form a 64-
bit plaintext, and outputs a 64-bit ciphertext. The ciphertext,
which is also divided in four words, is streamed out by the
Tx/Rx interface. The streamed-out data can be sent out by
backscattering through the inductive link. The external induc-
tor is on a wearable patch described in [11] which is placed on
top of the device. The design of the inductive link is presented
in [12]. The parameters of the Encryption/Decryption unit can
be set through JTAG.
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Fig. 2. The conceptual view of the subcutaneous IMD of Fig. 1. It receives
power via an inductive link (reprinted from [8]). It consists of a sensor array
for metabolite detection and calibration. The front-end IC controls and reads
out the sensor array and transmits the measured data back to the patch. The
front-end IC is where the encryption system is implemented.
The patch sends the data to a higher-level system like a
smart phone of a laptop through Bluetooth, for decryption, data
analysis, display, and decision-making. The patch is fully con-
trollable from the higher-level system. The system commands
the patch to start/stop sending power to the subcutaneous IMD,
as well as the conﬁguration commands.
III. THREAT MODELS
Personal health data has the potential to be misused for
ﬁnancial gain, discrimination, tracking or violence among
others [13]. However the implementation of strong security
is at odds with the low-cost and low-power system described
in this paper. Hence we take a somewhat non-traditional and
asymmetric approach by relying on the trust of standard key
distribution in higher levels of the system where cost is not
so important.
The key classes of IMD vulnerabilities researchers have
identiﬁed are control vulnerabilities, in which an unauthorized
person can gain control of an IMD’s operation or even disable
its therapeutic services, and privacy vulnerabilities, in which
an IMD exposes patients data to an unauthorized party. Both
kinds of vulnerability may be harmful to patients’ health
outcome, and are avoidable [1].
Two threat scenarios we consider are: (i) trusted patch is
removed and placed on a rogue implant (e.g. falsiﬁed data for
insurance fraud) (ii) rogue patch is used to extract data from
a trusted implant. (e.g. stealing of personal health data)
Our scheme also avoids potential weaknesses in the patch
or in the Bluetooth link and higher levels. The patch is a
low-cost device that cannot afford expensive tamper-prooﬁng.
Thus we must avoid storing secrets on the patch that could
be somehow extracted and then used to clone the patch or
otherwise impersonate the patch. The lightweight Bluetooth
link does not need to be secure in our scenario either. Our
approach avoids the need for two-way authentication by auto-
matically encrypting and signing all outgoing data. This avoids
potential replay or relay attacks, both recently demonstrated in
automotive and smart-card applications [14]. We do not protect
against potentially malicious control of the device. This is a
topic for future research, but we expect standard authentication
techniques to be used as a defence. Malicious control could
either destroy or falsify biosensor data.
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Fig. 3. The block diagram of the front-end IC. The analog blocks are coloured
in yellow and the digital blocks in blue.
By selecting the newly standardized Keccak scheme, we
beneﬁt from the large amount of analysis and testing per-
formed during the standardization process. In contrast, pro-
prietary cryptographic schemes are often quickly broken due
to their lack of exposure to the academic community.
An open topic is the possibility of side-channel attacks
due to implementation issues. These could take the form of
power, timing of electromagnetic analysis, or more active fault
injection techniques. These will be similar to recent work on
RFID side-channels [15]. It has become generally accepted
that publishing of attacks and vulnerabilities provides more
general insights about the security of systems [16].
IV. SECURITY MODULE
Security of biosensor data has to be guaranteed in various
levels: During measurement and processing, from outside
observers (also known as side-channel attackers [17]), during
communication from third parties, and during storage from
unauthorized users. There are several algorithms and standards
designed and extensively analysed to achieve these targets. The
internationally accepted Advanced Encryption Standard, AES,
is perhaps the most widely used encryption algorithm. It is
very well-analysed, tested, and proved to be secure. However,
encryption alone is not sufﬁcient. Another important operation
that has to be performed on the secure data is authentica-
tion, which is also very well-established and standardized
by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Authenticated encryption combines both authentication and
encryption in order to provide conﬁdentiality, integrity and
authenticity of the data, simultaneously. It has proven to be
much more effective, especially on resource-limited devices,
than simultaneous use of an encryption algorithm and an
authentication algorithm.
Block cipher based special modes of operation, such as
CCM, CWC, OCB, EAX and GCM [22], are the most
popular authenticated encryption schemes. More recently, use
of sponge-based hash functions as authenticated encryption
primitives has been proposed [18]. A sponge function or a
sponge construction is a class of algorithms with ﬁnite internal
state that takes an input bit stream of any length and produces
an output bit stream of any desired length. It is built from
three components: (i) A state memory, S, containing b bits:
It is divided into two parts, R of size r bits and C of size
c = b − r bits. The parameter r is called the bitrate and c is
the capacity. (ii) A function, f , of ﬁxed length that permutes
or transforms the state memory. (iii) A padding function P :
It appends enough bits to the input string so that the length
of the padded input is a whole multiple of the bitrate, r. The
padded input can thus be broken into r-bit blocks.
With its arbitrarily long input and output sizes, the sponge
construction allows construction of various cryptographic
primitives such as a hash function, a stream cipher or a
message authentication code (MAC) [19]. Keccak is the
best known and most thoroughly analysed sponge-based hash
function [6] and it offers a very lightweight construction,
especially for hardware implementations [21]. Keccak can also
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Fig. 4. DUPLEXSPONGE construction for authenticated encryption
be tweaked to operate with reduced state size, which make it
even more lightweight and the ideal choice for our application.
We use Keccak in DuplexSponge conﬁguration, which is
based on the SpongeWrap run in duplex mode [20]. In this
mode, the key and the Initialization Vector (IV) are added to
the zero initial state as a whole or in chunks. This process is
known as the initialization phase, where the internal state of
the cipher is initialized with both secret key and non-secret
IV. Following this phase, duplex operation begins, where the
incoming plaintext is processed in blocks deﬁned by the bit
rate, r. The sponge function absorbs each incoming data block
into its internal state, while the corresponding ciphertext block
is generated in parallel. Upon completion of processing of
all plaintext data, the authenticated tag is squeezed from the
internal state in the ﬁnalization phase.
The generalized scheme is illustrated in Fig. 4, where
pad and crop functions are simple as bit addition and bit
removal, respectively. In modiﬁed forms of the scheme, such
as donkeySponge or monkeyDuplex, it is also possible to
use to the whole state input size b rather than the bitrate r
for key and IV absorption. These speciﬁc forms even allow
different round counts for ninit, nabsorb and nsqueeze in order
to increase the average throughput. In our case, we have used
the same number of rounds for all in order to guarantee the
security claim of the Keccak proposal.
However, instead of using the standard sizes for bitrate and
capacity, we reduced the overall state size in order to achieve
a compact implementation with a security level that would not
have been possible at this cost with any other authenticated
encryption scheme. The data block size and state size are
selected as 4 and 100 bits, respectively. Together with 2 bits
of padding and one bit of parity, this corresponds to a datarate
r = 7, which provides ﬁrst order preimage security of 86 bits
(= b − 2 × r) and second order preimage security of 46 bits
(= (b− r)/2). The corresponding round number is chosen as
16, as stated in the Keccak speciﬁcation.
The circuit for the security module is shown if Fig. 5. It is
composed of the security core and the interface wrapper. Upon
start, the 80-bit parallel key is read from the key register in
4-bit packages. It then starts receiving 16-bit data packages
(48-bit IV followed by 64-bit sensor data – plaintext) from
the sensor interface, which it also processes in 4-bit packages.
All the key, IV and plaintext data are absorbed into the
sponge state. IV and ciphertext are sent to the transmitter.
Finally, the internal state is squeezed from the security core
in 4-bit packages in order to extract the 32-bit message
authentication tag. All the 4-bit extracted data are converted
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Fig. 5. The implementation of the biosensor security module: permutation
based authenticated encryption
to 16-bit parallel data at the output serial-to-parallel converter.
Each 4-bit package is processed in 16 rounds.
In order to achieve low power, we opted for a low bandwidth
tweak of the Keccak secure hash function used in authenticated
encryption mode. We also made aggressive utilization of bit-
serial architectures in an effort to reduce combinational logic
and minimize switching activity. While it may be argued
that such an approach might be risky from a power analysis
security point-of-view, we believe that the low data rates of
the system will make it impractical to mouth a power analysis
side-channel attack. Yet, this claim is to be tested, which in
fact is one of our future targets.
The security core alone occupies only 1550 gate-equivalents
(GE), which is the smallest authenticated encryption core
reported up-to-date. Together with the interface wrapper, total
area becomes 2280 GE. The simulated power consumption
of the whole design is below 7 μW at 500 KHz system
clock. Processing of each 4-bit block takes 20 clock cycles,
resulting in a total of 640 cycles for initialization, 320 cycles
for encryption and 160 cycles for tag generation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
To protect the wireless data transmission and to provide
security and privacy for the IMD information, we designed and
implemented a lightweight security system that uses a tweaked
version of the Keccak secure hash function implemented in an
authenticated encryption mode. The system is implemented in
0.18 μm standard CMOS technology and is fully integrated
with the frontend electronics of the IMD. It consumes only
7 μW with a throughput of 100 Kbps. Tests on the hardware
are planned soon. The implemented cryptosystem takes into
consideration the unique threat models and constraints of the
implantable biosensors. Therefore, it is a suitable cryptosystem
to be integrated into the future IMDs to avoid vulnerabilities
in both control and privacy.
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